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NOTES
TRANSFUSION-RELATED AIDS LITIGATION:
PERMITTING LIMITED DISCOVERY FROM BLOOD
DONORS IN SINGLE DONOR CASES
I
INTRODUCTION

The emergence of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome'
(AIDS) as a major cause of death during the 1980S2 has spawned

numerous legal issues. One such issue arises in the discovery proceedings of blood transfusion and blood bank litigation.8 Blood
1 Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome is a fatal disease resulting from infection
with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Centers for Disease Control, AIDS and
Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: 1988 Update, 38 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. No. S-4, 1 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Update]. The virus renders
the body unable to fight diseases. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALm AND HuMAN SERVICES, No. (CDC) HHS-88-8404, UNDERSTANDING AIDS 2 (1988) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING AIDS]. AIDS represents "the
clinical endpoint of the continuum of infection with HIV." 1988 Update,supra. For additional information on the history, causes, symptoms, treatment, and social ramifications
of AIDS, refer to the October 1988 edition of Scientific American, which is entirely devoted to the subject of AIDS. What Science Knows About AIDS, SC. AM., Oct. 1988.
2 The United States Department of Health and Human Services has identified
AIDS as "one of the most serious health problems that has ever faced the American
public." UNDERSTANDING AIDS, supra note 1, at 2. According to the Centers for Disease
Control in Atlanta, provisional data indicate that through November 1990 a total of
157,525 AIDS cases had been reported in the United States. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 9 (Dec. 1990) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT].

3 Several commentators have addressed the issue of discovery from blood donors
in the context of transfusion-related AIDS litigation. See Richard C. Bollow & Daryl J.
Lapp, Protectingthe Confidentialityof Blood Donors' Identities in AIDS Litigation, 37 DRAKE L.
REv. 343 (1987-1988); Robert K.Jenner, Identifying HIV-Infected BloodDonors, TRIAL,June
1989, at 47; Karen Shoos Upton, Blood DonorServices andLiability Issues Relating to Acquired
Immune Deficieny Syndrome, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 131 (1986); Note, AIDS: Anonymity in Donation Situations- Where PublicBenefit Meets Private Good, 69 B.U.L. REv. 187 (1989) (authored
by Mara S. Kirsh) [hereinafter Note, Anonymity in Donation Situations];Note, The Privacy
Interests of AIDS-Infected Blood Donors - Rasmussen v. South FloridaBlood Service 18 CUmB. L.
REv. 267 (1987) (authored by Suzette Lewis Davie); Note, AIDS-Related Litigation: the
Competing Interests Surrounding Discovery of Blood Donors' Identities, 19 IND. L. REV. 561
(1986) (authored by Denise Clare Andresen) [hereinafter Note, CompetingInterests]; Note,
AIDS: A Threat to Blood DonorAnonymity, 66 NEB. L. REV. 863 (1987) (authored by Cheryl
R. Zwart) [hereinafter Note, AIDS: A Threat]; see also Diane Wyatt, Martha Payne, Lynn
Ingram & Eva Quinley, AIDS: Legal and Ethical Concernsfor the ClinicalLaboratory, 4J. MED.
TECH. 108, 110-11 (1987) [hereinafter Legal and Ethical Concerns] (the devastating and
discriminatory effects of AIDS require both education as to infection control procedures
and a balancing of privacy rights against the maintenance of a safe blood supply). See
generally CHARLES S. DALE, NANCY L. JONES, JAY R. SHAMPANSKY, THE LIBRARY OF CON-
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transfusions, although a relatively minor source of HIV transmission, 4 have involved blood banks in at least two distinct forms of
lawsuits.
In one type of lawsuit, referred to in this Note as a multiple
donor case, an HIV-infected plaintiff seeks to prove that he acquired
the virus from blood transfusions. This type of case arises in two
different contexts. In the first, the plaintiff sues a defendant in negligence for causing physical injuries, the treatment of which necessitated blood transfusions. Here, the infected plaintiff seeks to prove
that he contracted AIDS from the blood transfusions; any damage
award would then include compensation for his infection with
AIDS. 5 In the second context, the plaintiff sues the blood bank for
negligently failing to screen out an HIV-infected donor. Here, too,
the plaintiff must prove that the transfusions provided by the blood
bank caused him to acquire AIDS. 6 In both contexts, the plaintiff
seeks discovery of the identities of all the blood donors from whom
he received transfusions. To prove that he contracted HIV from the
transfusions, the plaintiff must show that at least one donor carries
HIV or suffers from AIDS. The plaintiff may need to question the
donors to obtain this information.
In a second type of lawsuit, referred to in this Note as a single
donor case, a recipient of HIV-infected blood sues the blood bank
for negligence. Unlike the multiple donor case, however, neither
causation nor the donor's HIV status is at issue. Here, the blood
bank has acknowledged that it provided the recipient with HIV-infected blood, because the bank identified the original donor as HIVinfected when the donor attempted a repeat donation. The transfusion recipient seeks to prove that the blood bank acted negligently
in failing to screen out the HIV-infected donor. He therefore may
GRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS PUB. No. 87-738 A,
BLOOD TESTING FOR ANTIBODIES TO THE AIDS VIRUS: THE LEGAL ISSUES (1987) (discussing the legal issues surrounding blood testing, including constitutional and statutory

bases for protecting public health, privacy, testing accuracy, and for protecting against
discrimination); NANCY L. JONES, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH REPORT FOR CONGRESS PUB. No. 87-236 A, ACqUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME
(AIDS): A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR LEGAL ISSUES (1987) (discussing AIDS-related
issues including those pertaining to federal statutes, discrimination, education, employment, and criminal law).
4 Sexual contact and the sharing of drug needles represent the main sources of
virus transmission. UNDERSTANDING AIDS, supra note 1, at 2. According to provisional
data collected by the Centers for Disease Control as of November 1990, a cumulative
total of 3874 cases of AIDS have resulted from transfusions of blood, blood components, or receipt of tissue; the total includes 905 new cases reported between December
1989 and November 1990. HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
5 See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987) (exemplifying the first variation of the multiple donor case).
6 See Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 137 Misc. 2d 306, 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(exemplifying the second variation of the multiple donor case).
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need to question the donor to determine whether the blood bank
followed its own screening guidelines in accepting the particular
7
donation.
In both types of lawsuits, the blood bank alone knows the identity of the donor. The blood bank typically provides the plaintiff
with any documentation generated during the screening process,
but refuses the plaintiff's discovery request for identifying information, including the donors' names, addresses, and telephone
numbers.
In determining whether to grant discovery, courts balance the
competing interests of the plaintiff and the donor. In the multiple
donor case, the plaintiff asserts his interest in obtaining information
necessary either to receive full compensation for injuries suffered
.(the first context) or to prove negligence (the second context). In
the single donor case, the plaintiff's interest always lies in obtaining
information necessary to prove negligence. In both types of cases,
the blood bank asserts the donor's interest in confidentiality and society's interest in maintaining an adequate volunteer blood supply.
Although all courts have analyzed the question of compelling discovery within this balancing framework, their conclusions vary.
Some courts have flatly denied discovery; others have permitted different forms of limited discovery. While the particular facts surrounding each discovery request certainly influence the courts'
decisions, the variations in judicial decisions reflect differing weights
that courts accord to the competing interests. Just as significantly,
these variations indicate a judicial failure adequately to appreciate
the distinctions between multiple and single donor cases.
This Note explores both the distinctions between the multiple
and single donor cases and the competing interests. The Note argues that courts should deny discovery from a blood donor in multiple donor cases but should permit limited discovery from a blood
donor in single donor cases, provided the plaintiff demonstrates a
need to depose that donor. Courts can craft such discovery under
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" to protect the
donor's identity from public disclosure, while enabling the plaintiff
to collect the information necessary to prove his claim. Such limited
discovery should have no appreciable impact on the nation's volunteer blood supply.

See Boutte v. Blood Sys., 127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989) (exemplifying the sin7
gle donor case). For background information on this type of litigation, see Gregory N.
Woods & Ann V. Thornton, Deadly Blood- Litigation of Transfusion-AssociatedAIDS Cases in
Texas, 21 Tax. TECH L. REv. 667 (1990).
8 See infra notes 9-44 and accompanying text.
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II
BACKGROUND

A.

Discovery and Protective Orders Under Rule 26(c)

The rules of discovery, set forth in Rules 26 through 37 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specify the means by which litigants collect information before trial. 9 The Rules include provisions regarding both the scope and the methods of discovery. The
central purpose of discovery is to enable litigants to conduct a wide
search for facts and other material that may help them prepare and
present their cases. 10
Pursuant to this purpose, Rule 26(b)(1) allows for a broad
scope of discovery.' 1 The Rule permits discovery, unless limited by
court order, of any information that meets the tests for relevance
and absence of legal privilege.' 2 Courts view the relevance requirement with flexibility.' 3 The legal privilege referred to in the Rule
relates to evidentiary privileges. 14 The Rule further states that inadmissibility at trial does not in itself limit the scope of discovery.' 5
Rule 26(b), however, does not operate in a vacuum. Rather,
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enables a district
court to limit the expansive scope of discovery that Rule 26(b)
would otherwise permit. Specifically, Rule 26(c) authorizes a court
to issue protective orders designed to safeguard persons or parties
9

4 JAMES W. MOORE, JAY D. LUCAS & GEORGEJ. GROTHEER, JR., MOORE'S FEDERAL

PRACTICE

26.02 (2d ed. 1989).

10 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes on 1946 amendment, reprintedin
FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PROCEDURE AND RULES 78 (West 1989) [hereinafter FEDERAL
CIVIL PROCEDURE]; see also Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017,
1024 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note (1946), reprintedin FEDERAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 78; see also First Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Alexander, 590 F.
Supp. 834, 840 (D. Haw. 1984).
12 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b). Rule 26(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Unless otherwise
limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as
follows: (1) ... Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action .... "
13 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379
U.S. 104, 114 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); Truswal Sys. Corp.
v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see aso Springer v.
Seamen, 821 F.2d 871, 882 (1st Cir. 1987) (where documents "may well be relevant" to
plaintiff's burden of proof, the district court improperly denied discovery on the basis of
irrelevancy).
14 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); Armour Int'l Co. v. Worldwide
Cosmetics, 689 F.2d 134, 135 (7th Cir. 1982); JAMES W. MOORE, 1 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLET 304 (1990).
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The Rule provides, in pertinent part: "It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes on 1946 amendment,
reprinted in FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 78.
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from a wide range of abusive discovery: 16 "Upon motion by a party
or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause
shown, the court ... may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppres,,17
sion or undue burden or expense ..
In implementing Rule 26(c), a trial judge retains considerable
discretion to determine, on the facts of a particular case, whether
and how to restrict discovery.' s The party seeking a protective order (either the plaintiff or the defendant) bears the burden of showing the existence of "good cause," as stated in the text of the Rule.' 9
Moreover, a showing of good cause must rest on demonstrable
'2 0
facts, not just "stereotyped and conclusory statements.
In determining whether to issue a protective order, a court does
not confine its perspective to the party seeking protection. The
court also considers "the relative hardship to the non-moving party
should the protective order be granted." 2 1 In practice, district
22
courts balance the interests of the parties or persons involved.
The Rule itself does not explicitly incorporate a balancing process;
however, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
"While Rule 26(c) articulates a single standard for ruling on a protective order motion, that of 'good cause,' the federal courts have
superimposed a somewhat more demanding balancing of interests
"

16

See 8 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-

DURE § 2035, at 260 (1970) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
18 Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 71 F.R.D. 388, 389 (N.D. Cal.
1976); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2036, at 268; Richard L. Marcus, Myth and
Reality in Protective OrderLitigation, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 2 (1983).

19 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 145-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 953 (1987); General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,

467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984) (Rule 26(c) requires a showing of good cause).
20 General Dynamics Corp., 481 F.2d at 1212 (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
16, § 2035, at 264-65).
21 Id
22 Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1088

(5th Cir. 1982) (en banc). In Marrese,Judge Posner stated:
In ruling on a motion under Rule 26(c) to limit discovery, the district
court must compare the hardship to the party against whom discovery is
sought, if discovery is allowed, with the hardship to the party seeking discovery if discovery is denied. Not only the magnitude of this hardship,
but its nature, must be considered.
Id; see Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904
(1977); General Dynamics Corp., 481 F.2d at 1212; Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
101 F.R.D. 355 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985); Carlson Cos.,
Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1088 (D. Minn. 1973); see also Seattle
Times, 467 U.S. at 36 ("The trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and interests of parties affected by discovery.").

932

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

'[Vol.

76:927

approach to the Rule." 23
The interests weighed by the court vary with the facts of each
case. If the plaintiff seeks discovery, he obviously expresses an interest in proving his claim. Similarly, a defendant may have an important interest in preparing his trial defense.2 4 The party or
person from whom discovery is sought may have an interest in
avoiding delay, 25 excessive expense, 26 or an infringement of confidentiality.2 7 For example, Rule 26(c)(7) recognizes an interest in
the confidentiality of trade secrets by providing a basis for their pro28
tection from disclosure.
A court weighing these interests will carefully consider whether
and to what degree the party needs the information sought. In general, the court's willingness to limit discovery increases to the extent
the party seeking discovery fails to show a need for the information.2 9 Other factors include whether the information is sought
from a party or nonparty, and whether it could be obtained from
30
other sources.
If the court decides to issue a protective order, it can tailor the
limitation on discovery as it sees fit. 3 ' As stated by Wright and
Miller: "[A] court may be as inventive as the necessities of the case
require."3 2 Rule 26(c) itself sets forth a nonexclusive list of eight
types of protective orders, including complete denial of discovery,
limitations as to subject matter, and a limitation on persons present
to those designated by the court.5 3 Only very rarely will the court
23

Farnsworth, 758 F.2d at 1547 (citations omitted).

24

Id.

25 See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34-35.
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 35.
27 See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 35.
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).
29 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2036, at 270; see Farnsworth v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 101 F.R.D. 355 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aft'd, 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985); see
also United Airlines v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213, 219 (D. Del. 1960) (no discovery

permitted given government's interest in secrecy where plaintiff seeking discovery
showed only a minimal need for the information).
30

Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 390 (N.D.

Cal. 1976).
31
32

Marcus, supra note 18, at 1.
WRIGHT & MILLER,supra note 16, § 2036, at 270.

33

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The Rule specifies the following types of orders:
(1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only
on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain
matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited

to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present
except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information not

NOTE-AIDS LITIGATION

1991]

933

entirely deny a request for a deposition;3 4 use of limitations is much
more common. As one appellate court stated: "It is very unusual
for a court to prohibit the taking of a deposition altogether and absent extraordinary circumstances, such an order would likely be in
35
error."
Important to the analysis of discovery from blood donors, Rule
26(c) implicitly protects the privacy of the person from whom discovery is sought. 3 6 Although nowhere does the language of Rule
26(c) provide that a court may limit discovery to protect privacy, the
United States Supreme Court stated in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
that "discovery also may seriously implicate privacy interests of litigants and third parties." 3 7T The Court acknowledged that public disclosure of information obtained through discovery "could be
damaging to reputation and privacy" and added that "[t]he government clearly has a substantial interest in preventing this sort of
abuse of its processes." 3 8
In Seattle Times, the Court recognized that a religious group had
a privacy interest in limiting public disclosure of its members and
sources of financial support.3 9 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the
Supreme Court of Washington, which had upheld a trial court's decision to limit discovery by prohibiting the discovering party from
publicly disseminating the discovered information. 40 Additionally,
other courts have recognized the privacy interests of participants in
scientific research studies 4 1 and sexual partners of plaintiffs in a
42
products liability action.

In instances where a party seeks a protective order for reasons
of privacy or for any other reason, the court faces the inherent tension between Rules 26(b) and 26(c). The Supreme Court, addressbe disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8)that the parties
simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
Id-

34 Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir. 1979); Medlin v. Andrew, 113
F.R.D. 650, 653 (M.D.N.C. 1987); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 92 F.R.D.
429,437 (E.D. Pa. 1981); WRIGHr & MILLER, supra note 16, § 2037, at 135 (Supp. 1989);
see also CBS v. Ahern, 102 F.R.D. 820, 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (despite extremely busy
schedule, deposition permitted); Haviland & Co. v. Montgomery Ward &Co., 31 F.R.D.
578, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (despite physical illness, deposition permitted).
35
36
37
38

Salter, 593 F.2d at 651.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35 n.21 (1984).

Id at 35.

Id
Id at 37.
40
Id at 26.
41
Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 785 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985); Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494, 499 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Lampshire v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 94 F.R.D. 58, 60 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
42
Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 122 F.R.D. 580, 582 (D. Or. 1988).
39
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ing mushrooming litigation costs in Herbert v. Lando,43 expressed
this tension between the goals of promoting liberal discovery and
preventing abusive discovery. The Court stated:
[We have] more than once declared that the deposition-discovery
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment to effect
their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil trials.
[But] ... the district courts should not neglect their power'to restrict discovery where "justice requires [protection for] a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense .... " Rule 26(c). With this authority at hand,
judges should not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over
44
the discovery process.
The cases that follow demonstrate several courts' efforts to resolve
this tension in the blood donor context.
B.

Multiple Donor Cases

In 1987, state courts decided three cases in which plaintiffs
sought discovery from multiple blood donors to prove that they acquired AIDS from blood transfusions: Rasmussen v. South Florida
Blood Service,4 5 Krygier v. Airweld, Inc.,46 and Tarrant County Hospital
District v. Hughes.4 7 In each of these cases the blood bank opposed
the plaintiff's discovery efforts.
In Rasmussen, the Florida Supreme Court denied discovery of
donor identities under the Florida equivalent of Rule 26(c). 4s In
1982, the plaintiff Rasmussen received fifty-one units of blood after
he was hit by a car. 49 Approximately one year after he sued the
driver for his personal injuries, Rasmussen developed AIDS. 50 In
an effort to establish that he contracted AIDS via the postaccident
transfusions, his estate asked South Florida Blood Service, the
source of the blood, for information identifying all fifty-one blood
donors. 5 ' The trial court ordered disclosure; the intermediate appellate court reversed and denied discovery. 52 The Florida
Supreme Court upheld the appellate court's decision.55 In balancing the competing interests, the court placed particular emphasis on
the donors' privacy rights. The court stated that discovery of blood

49

441 U.S. 153 (1979).
Id. at 177 (citations omitted).
500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
137 Misc. 2d 306, 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 535-38.
Id. at 534.

50

Id.

51
52

Id.
Id.
Id. at 535.

43
44
45
46
47
48

53
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donor identities "implicates constitutionally protected privacy interests." 4 The court did not apply the federal constitutional right to
privacy, concluding only that, under "some circumstances," 5 5 it protects personal matters from disclosure. Instead, the court relied on
a provision of the Florida Constitution that provides an explicit
right of privacy.5 6 Additionally, the court found that disclosure of
57
donor identities could prove extremely damaging to the donors.
Agreeing with the lower appellate court, the court concluded
that "society's interest in a strong and healthy blood supply will be
furthered by the denial of discovery in this case." 5 8 The court also
stated: "In light of this, it is clearly 'in the public interest to discourage any serious disincentive to volunteer blood donation.' -59
With respect to the plaintiff's interest, the Rasmussen court
60
viewed the probative value of the discovery sought as minimal.
The plaintiff sought to prove a causal link between the personal injuries he received in the accident and his subsequent contraction of
AIDS. 6 1 The court acknowledged his interest in obtaining full recovery for his injuries by establishing this link, but found this interest greatly outweighed by "[t]he potential of significant harm to
62
most, if not all, of the fifty-one unsuspecting donors."
A New York trial court faced a similar multiple donor discovery
issue in Krygier v. Airweld, Inc. 63 and, like Rasmussen, denied discovery
of donor identities. 64 The Krygier court based its denial of discovery
of the donors' identities on New York Abuse of Discovery rules and
society's interest in an adequate blood supply. 65 The court, however, also stated that the rationale underlying the physician-patient
privilege-protection of patient privacy and fostering of free communication between patient and physician-applied in the blood

55

Id. at 537.
Id. at 536.

56

Id

57
58

Id. at 537.

54

Id at 538.

Id (quoting the intermediate appellate court in South Fla. Blood Serv. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 804 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
60 Id
59

61
62
63
64

Id at 534.
Id at 538.

137 Misc. 2d 306, 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
Id at 309, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 477. In Kiygier, the decedent's wife sued several defendants, including the blood bank, for injuries received in an explosion. Id at 307, 520
N.Y.S.2d at 476. The plaintiff's decedent received transfusions of 21 units of blood,
some of which, the plaintiff alleged, were infected with HIV. Id at 308, 520 N.Y.S.2d at
476. The decedent contracted AIDS. Id The plaintiff sought discovery of the identity
of the donors in an effort to prove that the blood actually was infected. Id at 307-08, 520
N.Y.S.2d at 476.
65 Id at 309, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
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donor context. 6 6 The court found this rationale especially compelling where, as here, the donors acted altruistically yet could suffer
67
embarrassment through disclosure of their identities.
Although the Rasmussen and Kygier courts completely denied
discovery, in TarrantCounty HospitalDistrictv. Hughes68 an intermediate appellate court upheld a trial court's order compelling a hospital
to disclose donor identities. 69 The order, however, prohibited the
plaintiff from either directly or indirectly contacting any donors
without prior permission from the court.7 0 In contrast to the underlying lawsuits in Rasmussen and Krygier, in Tarrant the plaintiff sued
the hospital for allegedly providing transfusions that resulted in the
decedent's development of AIDS and subsequent death. 7' The hospital denied the allegations and did not acknowledge that any of the
72
donors had AIDS or had tested positive for HIV.
The Tarrant court saw the plaintiff's interest in blood donor
identities as legitimate, reasoning that, absent such information, "it
is unlikely the plaintiff will be able to prosecute her cause of action."' 7 3 Disclosure of donor identities, the court stated, did not
represent a violation of their privacy rights, nor did the record show
that the donors' need for confidentiality outweighed the plaintiff's
need for the information. 74 Finally, the court found that the hospital had failed to establish that the discovery permitted would adversely impact the blood supply. 7 5 In the court's view, the hospital's
argument that disclosure would hurt the blood supply was just as
speculative as the argument that disclosure would benefit the blood
76
supply by discouraging blood donations by HIV-infected donors.
C.

Single Donor Cases
1. Single Donor Cases PermittingLimited Discovery

In three relatively recent single donor cases, in which the plaintiff sued a blood bank for negligence, the courts permitted limited
discovery from a donor who had tested positive for the antibody to
Id. at 308-09, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
Ia- at 309, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
734 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 676.
Id. at 679.
Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 676, 680.
73
Id. at 679.
74 Id.
75
Id. at 680.
76 Id. For a case factually similar to Tarrantwhere the court permitted discovery of
donor identities, see Gulf Coast Regional Blood Center v. Houston, 745 S.W.2d 557
(Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
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HIV: Boutte v. Blood Systems, 7 7 Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. Dis79
trict Court78 and Mason v. Regional Medical Center.
Boutte v. Blood Systems 8 0 illustrates the facts that typically give
rise to this single donor discovery problem. During surgery in July
1987, plaintiff Otto Boutte received transfusions of fifteen units of
blood.8 1 Earlier that month, a volunteer had donated blood at
Blood Systems, a nonprofit blood bank.8 2 Blood Systems tested that
donor's blood for the HIV antibody; the blood tested negative.8 3 A
Blood Systems technician also screened the volunteer to determine
his eligibility to donate. 84 As part of this screening process, Blood
Systems provided each prospective donor with an information sheet
describing the risk profile for AIDS.8 5 The technician then conducted a screening interview in which he asked the donor personal
history questions, including whether the donor had sexual contact
86
with either AIDS sufferers or individuals in high risk categories.
The questionnaire used in the interview indicated that the donor
87
answered negatively to all questions relating to exposure to AIDS.
In September 1987, the donor gave a second unit of blood at Blood
Systems; this unit tested positive for the HIV antibody. 88 The blood
bank reacted by notifying the hospital that had received the prior
donation. 8 9 Boutte, who had received the donor's blood, subsequently tested positive for the presence of the HIV antibody. 90
Boutte and his wife sued Blood Systems, alleging negligence in
donor screening and blood testing. 9 1 The plaintiffs sought the identity of the donor in order to depose him and thus determine
whether the Blood Systems technician adhered to the blood bank's
127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989).
763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988).
79
121 F.R.D. 300 (W.D. Ky. 1988). In another single donor case, Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hospital Center, 386 Pa. Super. 574, 587, 563 A.2d 531, 537 (1989), the
appellate court issued a vague order instructing the trial court to fashion a discovery
order that would permit the plaintiffs to learn, from the donor, what screening procedure the blood bank adhered to, but that would also protect the identity and confidentiality of the donor.
80
127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989).
81
Id. at 123.
82 Id
83 Id
77
78

84

I at 124.

85

Idj

86
87

'
d
Id at 124-25.

88

Id at 123.

89

Id

Id
Id. In 47 states, by statute, blood banks are liable only in negligence. Lipton,
supra note 3, at 135.
90

91

938

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:927

screening guidelines during the interview. 92 Blood Systems refused
to provide the plaintiffs with the donor's identity, but did provide
copies of the questionnaire used in the donor interview. 93 Here, as
in several previous cases, the donor alone could address the issue of
whether the blood bank adhered to the guidelines in that particular
interview. 94 The interviewing technician, because of the large
number of donors he screened, lacked a specific recollection of the
donor in question. 95 Further, only the donor could reveal whether
96
he understood the AIDS-related questions.
Blood Systems sought a protective order barring the plaintiffs'
request for discovery of the donor's identity. 97 Blood Systems
based its arguments on the blood donor's constitutional right to privacy98 and society's interest in maintaining an adequate supply of
blood. 99
The court recognized the donor's privacy interest as protected
by Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but also
found that the plaintiffs needed to gain access to the donor in order
to prove their claims.1 00 Addressing society's interest in the volunteer blood supply, the court reconciled the interests of society and
the plaintiffs: "[T]he infected donor is one of only two people who
knows whether the screening procedures were followed .... [T]his
information will.., ensure that blood suppliers establish and implement only the highest standards in collecting and selling blood
....,,101 The court balanced the competing interests in ordering,
under Rule 26(c), that the plaintiff could conduct limited discovery
of the donor. 10 2 To safeguard the donor from public disclosure,
the court: (1) restricted permissible discovery to a Rule 31 deposition upon written questions; 03 (2) permitted the donor to refrain
92 Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 125. The plaintiffs sought to question the donor on matters
including the following:
1) Did Blood Systems ask him the questions contained in the questionnaire prior to accepting his donation of blood?;
2) Did the donor actually receive the two information sheets given prior
to the questionnaire?
Id.
93 Id. at 123.
94 Id. at 124-26.

95

Id. at 124.

96

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

97
98
99

125.
123.
125.
126.

100
101

Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 126.

102
103

Id.
R. Civ. P. 31. The Rule provides, in pertinent part:
(a) ...A party desiring to take a deposition upon written questions shall
serve them upon every other party with a notice stating (1) the name and
FED.
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from providing identifying information; and (3) allowed Blood Systems' counsel to make arrangements to secure the donor's

confidentiality. 1 4
In Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court,105 in which
the facts closely paralled those in Boutte, 10 6 the Colorado Supreme
Court permitted discovery from a single blood donor in the form of
a deposition upon written questions.' 0 7 The Belle Bonfils court added a confidentiality safeguard, not included in Boutte, by requiring
the plaintiffs to route the questions through the clerk of the
court. 108

Like the Boutte court, the court in Belle Bonfils acknowledged the
donor's interest in confidentiality and society's interest in the blood
supply.' 0 9 The court noted, however, that the plaintiffs and society
shared an interest in "maintaining a safe blood supply." 1 10 The
court added: "Bonfils cannot claim absolute immunity from discovery when it is in the business of providing a product capable of
transmitting disease.""' The court stated that the screening documentation that the blood bank provided the plaintiffs lacked enough
information about the screening process to enable plaintiffs to prosecute their case. 1 12 Accordingly, the court found that discovery
address of the person who is to answer them, if known, and if the name is
not known, a general description sufficient to identify the person... and
(2) the name or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom
the deposition is to be taken.... (b) ... A copy of the notice and copies
of all questions served shall be delivered by the party taking the deposition to the officer designated in the notice, who shall proceed promptly,
in the manner provided by Rule 30(c), (e), and (f), to take the testimony
of the witnesses in response to the questions and to prepare, certify, and
file or mail the deposition, attaching thereto the copy of the notice and
the questions received by the officer.
Id

Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 126.
763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988).
106 In Belle Bonfils, the plaintiff/wife received six units of blood products as part of an
emergency hysterectomy. Id at 1004. The donor of one of those units subsequently
tested positive for the HIV antibody when he attempted to donate blood again. Id The
blood bank notified the hospitals that had received the donor's blood. Id Ultimately,
the plaintiff tested positive for the HIV antibody. Id at 1005. The transfusion recipient
and her husband sued the blood bank, alleging negligence in screening the donor and
testing his blood. Id at 1004. The blood bank had received the donation in March
1985, only weeks before it implemented the highly effective enzyme-linked immunosorbant assay (ELISA) test for HIV antibodies. Id at 1006. Plaintiffs sought discovery of all the donors' identities, but only that of the infected donor was at issue in the
reported case. Id at 1005. Plaintiffs sought to determine from the donor whether the
blood bank adhered to its own guidelines during the screening interview. IE at 1007.
107 Id at 1013.
108 Id at 1014.
109 Id at 1012.
110 Id
111 Id. at 1012-13.
112
Id. at 1013.
104

105
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from the donor was necessary and that the plaintiffs' interests outweighed those of the donor.1 1 3 The court concluded that limited
discovery in the form of a deposition upon written questions, routed
through the clerk of the court, would enable the plaintiffs "to obtain
the information they require, without risking the potentially adverse
consequences of disclosing publicly the identity of the donor and
without... infringing upon society's interests in a safe, adequate,
1 14
voluntary blood supply."'
In Mason v. Regional Medical Center,115 factually similar to both
Boutte and Belle Bonfils, 1 16 the court permitted the plaintiff to depose
the donor, but sought to safeguard the donor from public disclosure
by imposing a different limitation on discovery. 117 Specifically, the
court relied on its discretion under Rule 26(c) to prohibit all persons involved in the discovery from disclosing the donor's identity
and to limit knowledge of his identity to one attorney for each
side. 118 The court rejected the medical center's claim that the
United States Constitution protected the donor's privacy. 119 With
respect to society's interest in the volunteer blood supply, the court
found litde in the record to indicate how disclosure of donor identity would affect blood collections. 120 The court also expressed its
reluctance to "venture into the realm of public policy, that being the
province of other branches of government."121
In each of these single donor cases, the court considered the
three interests at stake and permitted discovery, albeit with significant limitations. In other single donor cases, however, courts have
rejected plaintiffs' requests for donor discovery.
2.

Single Donor Cases Denying Discovery

Recent single donor cases that have denied donor discovery include Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services 122 and Doe v. University of
Cincinnati.123
113
114

I&

I at 1014.

121 F.R.D. 300 (W.D. Ky. 1988).
In Mason, the plaintiff received blood transfusions necessitated by a hysterectomy. Id at 301. Four of the units of blood products received by the plaintiff did not
undergo testing for the HIV antibody. Only after the plaintiff received transfusions did
tests on retained samples indicate that one unit contained the AIDS-causing virus. Id
The plaintiffs, as in similar cases, sought to depose the donor in order to evaluate the
predonation screening he underwent. Id
117
Id at 303-04.
115
116

118

Id at 304.

119

Id at 303.
Id
Id

120
121
122
123

125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989).

42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (1988). Another single donor case in
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In Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, the court flatly prohibited any form of discovery from a blood donor known to have
donated the contaminated blood. 124 In contrast to Boutte, in which
the plaintiffs sought to determine what occurred during the screening process, 12 5 the plaintiffs here acknowledged that they wanted to
ask the donor "intimate details of his health history and how he be126
lieves that he became infected with the virus that causes AIDS."
Addressing the donor's interest in confidentiality, the court stated
that, given the "hysterical" public reaction to AIDS and discrimination against AIDS victims, public "disclosure of the donor's identity
could literally devastate his life." 12 7 The court stated that "[t]he
erosion of confidentiality" could negatively affect the quantity and
quality of the volunteer blood supply. 128 Significantly, the court
found that the donor's testimony would not, in all likelihood, prove
helpful in determining whether the blood bank should have permanently deferred the donor.12 9 The court stated: "Plaintiffs here, unlike the plaintiff in Belle Bonfils, stand little, if anything, to gain in
130
questioning the donor."'
In Doe v. University of Cincinnati,'3 an appellate court held that
the trial court had abused its discretion in compelling disclosure of a
donor's identity.' 3 2 The court, in denying discovery, found Rasmussen's rationale persuasive; it held that disclosure "implicated constitutionally protected privacy interests which outweighed plaintiff's
which the court denied discovery was Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360
(E.D. Mich. 1990). The court based its denial of discovery almost exclusively on the
view that court-ordered disclosure would have "a serious impact on volunteer blood
donations." Id.at 362.
124 Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. at 657. The plaintiff received a unit of infected blood during abdominal surgery. Id at 647. The plaintiff had
the HIV virus and suffered from AIDS-related complex when he and his wife brought
suit. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the blood bank failed to permanently screen out the
donor based on personal history he provided to the blood bank. Id Specifically, the
plaintiffs alleged that the blood bank should have disqualified the donor based on his
statement concerning a test for hepatitis. Id at 648-49. The court stated that the plaintiffs sought the donor's testimony in order to "help them make a more solid case." Id at
649.
125 Boutte v. Blood Sys., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989).
126 Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. at 651.
127 Id at 652.
128 Id at 653.
129 Id at 655.
130

Id

42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (1988).
Id at 233, 538 N.E.2d at 426. The plaintiff received a transfusion infected with
HIV in 1984, prior to the development of an effective blood test; he subsequently tested
positive for the presence of HIV. Id at 227-28, 538 N.E.2d at 420-21. The plaintiff
sought disclosure of the donor's identity, arguing that the donor alone could provide
information as to whether the blood bank followed its own screening procedures. Id at
232, 538 N.E.2d at 424.
131
132
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interests."' 3 3 The court saw no reason to compel disclosure when
the plaintiff failed to show that he could obtain the information only
from the donor. 3 4 In the court's view, denial of discovery would
serve "a vital public interest" in maintaining the volunteer blood
supply.' 3 5 Finally, the court stated that while altruistic motivations
should not immunize a donor from discovery, "the charitable act
that is involved when a person donates his or her blood must be
3 6

recognized."1

III
ANALYSIS

A.

Potential Bases for Denial of Discovery

When seeking protective orders, blood banks have argued that
donors' identities should remain confidential. Blood banks have asserted several legal theories, independent of Rule 26(c), that ostensibly require denial of donor discovery. These theories include the
37
constitutional right to privacy and the physician-patient privilege.'
133

134
135
136
137

Id at 232, 538 N.E.2d at 424.
Id at 233, 538 N.E.2d at 425.
Id

Id.

Statutes restricting disclosure of HIV-related information, particularly HIV test
results, may provide an additional source of authority for the protection of donor confidentiality. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2780-2787 (McKinney 1989) defines HIv-related
information broadly but enables a court to order limited disclosure upon a showing of a
compelling need for the information in a civil proceeding. Id. § 2785. California also
has a statute regulating disclosure of HIV blood tests. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 199.20-.28 (West Supp. 1989).
In Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo.
1988), the court held that Colorado statutes regulating disclosure of HIV testing information, CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 25-4-1404, -1409 (1987 Supp.), did not apply, because the
donor tested positive and the plaintiffs sought disclosure prior to the effective date of
the statute. Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1009. In Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Services, 125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989), the court held that the South Carolina Code regarding the confidentiality of HIV-infected individuals, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-29-80, -90, 135 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1988), did not operate to bar discovery in a negligence suit
against a blood bank. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. at 651. The
precise applicability of these and similar statutes to donor discovery is beyond the scope
of this Note.
Additionally, in Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d
419 (1988), the court found that a legitimate expectation of privacy protected the blood
donor. Id. at 233, 538 N.E.2d at 425. The court addressed this expectation of privacy in
the Rule 26(c) balancing process, rather than as a truly independent basis for denying
discovery. Id. The court found the donor "protected by the expectation of privacy
which arose during the blood-donation screening process." Id The court explained
that donors receive assurances of confidentiality, which give rise to this expectation of
confidentiality. Id. The Ohio court is the only court that raised this argument for donor
confidentiality. Given their discretion under Rule 26(c), courts can include this factor in
assessing the donor's interest in confidentiality when they balance the competing interests. See supra notes 9-44 and accompanying text.
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No court has based its discovery decision explicitly on either of
these theories. Rather, all courts that have denied discovery have
relied on Rule 26(c) or a state equivalent. 138 These legal theories
and the policies that underlie them, however, may bear on the
courts' decisions under Rule 26(c), and therefore merit discussion.
1. Federal or State ConstitutionalRight to Privacy
Several courts have discussed whether blood donor discovery
implicates the constitutional right to privacy. No court, however,
has specifically stated that donor discovery would violate either the
federal or a state constitution. In Rasmussen,1 3 9 the court found that

disclosure of donor identities would enable the plaintiff to investigate the donors' personal backgrounds.'

40

The potential for this

probing, in conjunction with the stigma and discrimination associated with even the suspicion of AIDS, led the court to conclude in
dictum that "the disclosure sought here implicates constitutionally
protected privacy interests."' 14 1 The court, however, denied discovery solely under the Florida equivalent of Rule 26(c); the constitu42
tional analysis only defined the donors' interest in confidentiality. 1
Similarly, in neither Doe v. University of Cincinnati143 nor Taylor v.
West Penn Hospital'" (both single donor cases), did the court rely on
the constitutional right to privacy to deny discovery. In Doe v. University of Cincinnati, the court explicitly recognized the Rasmussen concern that discovery implicates constitutional interests.1 4 5 The court,
however, denied discovery under Ohio's equivalent of Rule 26(c).146
138 In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that a protective order, which restricted the party seeking the information from disseminating it publicly, did not violate the first amendment. Id at 37. A Washington state
trial court had issued the protective order pursuant to Washington Superior Court Civil
Rule 26(c). Id at 25-26. The Washington Rule mirrors the language of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c), except it states "the court in the county," WASH. SUPER. CT. Crv. R.
26(c) (emphasis added), where the Federal Rule provides "the court in the district." FED.
R. Cir. P. 26(c) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court stated that Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 26(c) "is typical of the provisions adopted in many states." Seattle
Times, 467 U.S. at 26 n.7. The Court also stated that "[m]ost States, including Washington, have adopted discovery provisions modeled on Rules 26 through 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." Id at 29.
For several examples of state equivalents to Federal Rule 26(c), see C.R.C.P. 26(c)
(Colorado); FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.280(c); N.Y. Cir. PRAc. L. & R. 3103; OHio Cv. R. 26(c);
PA. R.C.P. 4011(b).
140

500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
lId at 537.

141

Id

139

142 Id at 535-38; see also Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 232,
538 N.E.2d 419, 424 (1988).
143 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (1988).
144 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (C.P. 1987).
145 Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d at 232, 538 N.E.2d at 424.
146 Id. at 233, 538 N.E.2d at 425.
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In Taylor v. West Penn Hospital,'4 7 the court, although it acknowledged that the scope of the discovery sought by the plaintiffs differed from the discovery at issue in Rasmussen, described the claim of
constitutional protection as "substantial."'' 48 Ultimately, the court
declined to decide the constitutional issue, relying instead on the
Pennsylvania equivalent of Rule 26(c) as the basis for its denial of

discovery. 149
All three of the courts mentioned above relied in large measure
on Whalen v. Roe' 50 in determining the contours of the constitutional right to privacy.' 5 ' In Whalen, the United States Supreme
Court described the right to privacy as divisible into two types of
interests: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions."' 5 2 The plaintiff in
Whalen challenged a New York statute requiring recipients of certain
prescription drugs to submit a form containing their names, addresses, and ages to the New York State Department of Health in
order to obtain their prescriptions.' 53 In upholding the statute, the
Court acknowledged that although it posed a threat to the plaintiff's
constitutional interest in nondisclosure, it was not "a sufficiently
54
grievous threat to . . . establish a constitutional violation."'
Whalen's analytical framework apparently requires a determination
of first, whether a constitutional privacy interest is at stake' 55 and
second, whether the disclosure, given its purpose, amounts to an
56
"impermissible invasion of privacy."'
The Whalen analytical methodology underwent further refinement in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 157 in which the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied it to medical records.
In Westinghouse, relied on by both the Taylor and the Doe v. University
of Cincinnati courts, the court found that employee medical records,
sought as part of an investigation by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), fell within Whalen's "personal
147

48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178 (C.P. 1987).

148

Id at 185.

Id at 186.
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
151 See Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 535 (Fla. 1987); Doe v.
University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d at 231, 538 N.E.2d at 423; Taylor, 48 Pa. D. &
C.3d at 185.
152
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted).
149
150

153

Id at 591-93.

154

Id at 600.

155

Id at 599-602.

156

Id at 602.
638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).

157
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matters" zone of constitutional protection. 158 The court, however,
weighed the competing interests and held that the "strong public
interest" in the NIOSH research justified the "minimal intrusion into the privacy which surrounds the employees' medical

records." 159
Several commentators have addressed the constitutional
dimensions of the donor's privacy interests. A student commentator 16 0 argues that the blood donor has a fundamental right to privacy, 16 1 based upon (1) the reasoning (if not the holdings) of cases
including Whalen and Westinghouse, (2) the invasiveness into a donor's personal life, and (3) the donor's expectation of confidentiality. 16 2 This commentator finds no compelling state interest, as
required by Griswold 163 and its progeny, to justify the infringement
that disclosure would cause. 16 In contrast, another commentator
terms Rasmussen's view of the constitutional right to privacy as "a
broad extension of the Supreme Court's interpretation,"' 16 5 explaining that "the Supreme Court has never upheld the disclosural right
16 6
to privacy."'
Not only has the Supreme Court never upheld the disclosural
right to privacy, but no court has explicitly extended the constitutional right to privacy to blood donors. The court in Mason v. RegionalMedical Center 167 explicitly rejected the claim of constitutional
protection. 168 The Mason court stated that "the claim of constitutionally protected blood donor privacy, under the facts of this case,
is a claim beyond the boundaries of the right of privacy."' 16 9 Resolving whether the constitutional right to privacy should be extended to
blood donors is unnecessary given the adequate protection afforded
blood donors by Rule 26(c). As the court stated in Boutte v. Blood
Systems, 170 because "the interests of both parties may be adequately
protected under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure... a constituId. at 577.
159 lIdat 580.
160 Note, Anonymity in Donation Situations, supra note 3.
161
Id at 205.
It at 195-97, 203-05.
162
Id at 203 n.1 14. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), is a seminal case
163
in the development of the constitutional right to privacy. In Griswold, the Court found a
state statute that prohibited contraceptive use unconstitutional because it swept too
broadly into the privacy rights of married couples. Id. at 479.
164 Note, Anonymity in Donation Situations, supra note 3, at 205.
165 Note, Competing Interests, supra note 3, at 587.
166 Id
121 F.R.D. 300 (W.D.Ky. 1988).
167
168 It at 303.
158

169

Id

170

127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989).
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tional analysis need not be applied."' 17 1
2. Physician-PatientPrivilege
During litigation, the physician-patient privilege operates to
172
suppress facts learned by a physician while treating a patient.
Applied through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or their state
equivalents, it prevents a party from discovering privileged information. 173 For example, Rule 26(b) provides that "[p]arties may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant."1 74
75
The physician-patient privilege has no common-law basis.'
Rather, it exists solely by statute in over forty states.1 7 6 These statutes vary, but generally require the existence of three things: "a
physician, a patient and a communication."' 1 77 The statutes also include numerous exceptions and waiver provisions. 178 One of the
most common exceptions exists in malpractice actions against the
physician. 17 9 Because of its exclusively statutory nature, courts
strictly construe the privilege. 180 The main purpose of the privilege
is to insure that the patient receives proper treatment by encouraging him to disclose fully his medical background and symptoms to
his physician.' 8 ' A more recently asserted, subsidiary rationale
views the privilege as a way of protecting the confidentiality of the
82
patient's communications.'
In several donor discovery cases, courts have held that the phy171 Id. at 125; see also Taylor v. West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 186 (1987)
("it is not necessary to decide whether plaintiffs' disco.very request is constitutionally
barred.").
172
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98 (Edward W. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
173 Bollow & Lapp, supra note 3, at 346.
174 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
175

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra

note 172, § 98.
176 8JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (John T. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
177 Jenner, supra note 3, at 51; see, e.g., Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App.
3d 227, 229, 538 N.E.2d 419,422 (1988) (physician, patient, and communication are the
three essential elements of the privilege).
178 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602 n.28.
179 Upton, supra note 3, at 168.
180 Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1009
(Colo. 1988) (quoting Williams v. People, 687 P.2d 950, 953 (Colo. 1984)); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d at 229, 538 N.E.2d at 422; Weis v. Weis, 147
Ohio St. 416, 428-29, 72 N.E.2d 245, 252 (1947).
181 Ziegler v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 250, 640 P.2d 181 (1982); MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 172, § 98.
182 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 172, § 105; see Krygier v. Airweld, Inc., 137
Misc. 2d 306, 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Marital and
Physician Privileges-A Riprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DuKE Lj.45, 50; Thomas
G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in FederalCourts: An Alternative to the ProposedFederal
Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. LJ. 61, 92 (1973).
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sician-patient privilege did not bar discovery from blood donors. In
Doe v. University of Cincinnati,18 3 the court held that the Ohio privi-

lege statute did not apply because (1) the blood donation was not
drawn by a physician; (2) a blood donor is not considered a patient
under the statute; and (3) the information provided by the donor
did not serve to facilitate his treatment, therefore it did not fall

within the statutory definition of "communication."'8 4 In Belle Bonfi/s,18 5 the court found the Colorado privilege inapplicable because
the donor received neither medical care nor treatment by a doctor;
86
only medical technicians attended the donor.
By contrast, the Krygier v. Airweld, Inc. court found the rationales
behind the privilege-encouragement of patient-physician communication and protection of patient privacy-applicable in the blood
8 7 The court, however, based its denial of discovery
donor context. 1
on New York's equivalent to Rule 26(c). l 8 No other court that has
addressed this discovery problem has found the privilege applicable
in any way.
Noted commentators generally view the privilege with scorn.
Wigmore has stated: "It is certain that the practical employment of
the privilege has come to mean little but the suppression of useful
truth-truth which ought to be disclosed."' 8 9 McCormick favors
"[c]omplete abolition of the privilege."' 9 0 Several recent commentators nevertheless find the privilege's rationale compelling specifically in the blood donor context. Although Lipton acknowledges
both the severe difficulties in applying physician-patient privilege
statutes to blood donors as well as the nonexistence of cases where
courts have extended the privilege to blood donors, she urges judicial extension of the privilege because she finds one of its rationales-protection of patient privacy-applicable to blood donors.' 9 '
Application of the physician-patient privilege in the blood donor context would eliminate courts' discretion in determining
42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (1988).
Id. at 229-30, 538 N.E.2d at 422-23.
185 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988).
186 lId at 1009; see Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1987) ("[The physician-patient privilege... is not applicable ....Nothing in
the record reflects that the blood donors were seen by a physician or received medical
care when they donated blood.").
187
137 Misc. 2d 306, 308-09, 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
188 Id. at 309, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
189 J. WIGMORE, supra note 176, § 2380a.
190 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 172, § 105.
191 Upton, supra note 3, at 165-69. Note that Upton serves as Assistant General
Counsel to the American Red Cross. Ia-at 131. For several other commentators who
have echoed her view, see Bollow & Lapp, supra note 3, at 346-51; Note, Anonymity in
Donation Situations, supra note 3, at 194-95; Note, AIDS: A Threat, supra note 3, at 877-82.
183

184
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whether to permit discovery. 192 Specifically, invoking the privilege
would prevent a court from considering the plaintiff's need for the
information and interest in recovery. It would operate to bar discovery regardless of the facts of the case. Rule 26(c) renders this
drastic result inadvisable, because a court can consider protection of
patient privacy, the only potentially applicable rationale of the privi193
lege, when it balances the competing interests.
Additionally, from a practical perspective, the question of extending the privilege is academic. Given commentators' general
distaste for the privilege' 94 and the courts' tendency to strictly construe it, 19 5 no court will likely extend the privilege so as to bar discovery of donor identities absent legislative action. As one court
has stated:
[B]ecause evidentiary privileges contravene the fundamental principle that "the public.., has a right to every man's evidence,"
exceptions to the obligation of every man to testify are neither
"lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for the truth." Thus, absent a "compelling justification for a new privilege," weighty judicial authority counsels
against the creation of a rule that will presumptively impinge
19 6
upon the truth finding process.
B.

Rule 26(c) and the Competing Interests at Issue
1. Rule 26(c)

Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (or a state
equivalent) 19 7 provides the soundest basis for protecting donor confidentiality because it enables a court to weigh all the competing interests and either bar discovery, as in Doe v. American Red Cross Blood
Services 198 and Doe v. University of Cincinnati,199 or craft limited discovery with a confidentiality safeguard, as in Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood
Center v. District Court20 0 and Boutte v. Blood Systems. 20 '
In determining whether to permit, limit, or deny discovery
under Rule 26(c), courts balance the competing interests. In the
blood donor context, courts weigh the plaintiff's interest in collectBollow & Lapp, supra note 3, at 346.
See supra notes 9-44 and accompanying text.
194 See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
195 See supra text accompanying note 180.
196 Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citations
omitted).
197 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
198
125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989).
199 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (1988).
200
763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988).
201
127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989).
192

193
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ing information needed to prove his claim against the donor's interest in confidentiality and society's interest in the volunteer blood
supply. A proper balancing of the competing interests requires
analysis of each interest at stake.
2.

The Plaintiff's Interest in ObtainingDonor Discovery

In both single and multiple donor cases, the plaintiff's interest
lies in collecting information necessary to prove his claim and recover damages. In the multiple donor case, the plaintiff may need
the information to prove that he contracted AIDS via transfusions.
Questioning the donors represents a starting point in proving this
claim. In Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service,20 2 for example, the
plaintiff sought to prove that he contracted AIDS through transfusions to show that injuries from the original accident ultimately re20 3
sulted in his acquisition of AIDS.
In the single donor case, the plaintiff needs to depose the donor
in an effort to prove negligent screening by the blood bank. Several
courts have acknowledged not only that the plaintiff needs to know,
from the donor's perspective, whether the blood bank adhered to its
screening procedures, but that other sources of information are in20 4
sufficient to meet the plaintiff's needs.
The plaintiff's interest in discovering necessary information accords with the purpose of discovery. According to the Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in its Notes on
the 1946 Amendments: "The purpose of discovery is to allow a
broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters
which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his
case." 20 5 This search for facts, though, merely serves as a vehicle
for the core rationale behind discovery: the search for truth and the
just determination of lawsuits based on truth. 20 6 Additionally, Rule
500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
See Boutte v. Blood Sys., 127 F.R.D. 122, 125 (W.D. La. 1989); Mason v. Regional Medical Center, 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988); Belle Bonfils Memorial
Blood Center v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1007, 1013 (Colo. 1988). But see Doe v.
University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 233, 538 N.E.2d 419, 425 (1988) (plaintiffs failed to show that they could not obtain the information from other sources).
205 FED. R. Cxv. P. 26(b) advisory committee's notes on 1946 amendment, reprintedin
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 78-79; see also Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 101 F.R.D. 355, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Mhe general philosophy of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure favors full disclosure of relevant information prior to trial."),
aft'd, 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
206 Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critiqueand Proposals
for Change, 31 VND. L. REv. 1295, 1298 (1978) (quoting Monier v. Chamberlin, 35 Ill.
2d 351, 361, 221 N.E.2d 410, 417 (1966) and Hon. Irving R. Kaufman,Judicial Control
Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 125 (1952)); see Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d
901, 903 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 92 F.R.D. 87, 90
202
203
204
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1 underscores this notion that determinations based on truth represent an overarching goal of the discovery system. Rule 1 provides,
in pertinent part, that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be
20 7
construed to secure the just... determination of every action.
Furthermore, under Rule 26(b)(1), the scope of discovery regarding
20 8
nonprivileged matter is very broad.
Additionally, the United States Supreme Court, in the "seminal" 20 9 opinion of Hickman v. Taylor,210 expressed its belief in the
need for full discovery: "civil trials in the federal courts no longer
need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent
with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial."' 21 1 The Court
continued: "[T]he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of
'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the
facts.... Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by
2 12
both parties is essential to proper litigation."
The purpose of the Rules, their language, and the Supreme
Court's view in Hickman lie behind the presumption, expressed
when courts seek to resolve discovery disputes, that "the public is
entitled to every person's evidence." 2 13 Of course, the limits imposed by Rule 26(b) (relevance and the absence of a legal privilege)
and the existence of Rule 26(c) (protective orders) demonstrate that
this presumption will not always apply. The presumption should require, though, that the court permit discovery absent a transcending
basis for curtailing the search for truth. 2 14 The remainder of this
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)) (" '[R]ight to discovery... stems from society's interest in a full and
fair adjudication of the issues ... .
207
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
See discussion of Rule 26(b) at supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
208
209
Brazil, supra note 206, at 1298.
210
329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Id. at 501.
211
212
Id. at 507.
213
Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 389 (N.D.
Cal. 1976) (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932)); see Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1971); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950);
Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (1lth Cir. 1985), aff'g 101 F.R.D.
355 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(quoting Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331); Farnsworth, 101 F.R.D. at 357.
See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
214
(1982). In In re Dinnan, the court affirmed an order compelling discovery despite a claim
for protection based on legal privilege. Id. at 433. The court quoted the Supreme Court
in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 49 (1980), as follows: "[privileges should be
accepted] only to the very limited extent that [there exists] . . .a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Id at 429-30; see Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 904 (2d
Cir. 1982).
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Note will show that in the single donor case, neither the donor's
interest in confidentiality nor society's interest in a volunteer blood
supply provides such a basis for denying discovery and curtailing
the search for truth.
3.

The Donor's Interest in MaintainingConfidentiality

In both the single and multiple donor cases, donors have an
interest in avoiding discovery. 215 Important differences exist, however, between these two types of cases. These differences help to
define the interests of the donor and a thorough understanding of
them can help a court properly balance the competing interests
under Rule 26(c).
Single and multiple donor cases differ in their potential impact
on the donor's privacy. The donor's interest in maintaining confidentiality varies with the degree to which discovery would intrude
on the donor's personal life. The intrusiveness of discovery, in turn,
depends in part on the type of information that the plaintiff seeks
when he requests identifying information.
In a multiple donor case, the plaintiff essentially wants to know
whether any of the donors have AIDS, carry HIV, or belong to a
high risk group. 21 6 This information will help the plaintiff prove
that he contracted AIDS via the transfusions.2 1 7 To determine, for
example, whether the donor is in a high risk group, the plaintiff will
likely ask questions that center on the donor's personal life.2 18
Moreover, as the court pointed out in Rasmussen v. South FloridaBlood
Service,2 19 disclosure of the donor's identity creates "the possibility
that a donor's co-workers, friends, employers, and others may be
queried as to the donor's sexual preferences, drug use or general
lifestyle."' 22 0 Such an inquiry, the court stated, "could be extremely
disruptive and even devastating to the individual donor" 22 1 because
it could" 'lead to discrimination in employment, education, housing
and even medical treatment.' ",222
In a single donor case, the information sought by the plaintiff
differs in kind from the information sought in a multiple donor case.
In a single donor case, whether the donor has AIDS or carries HIV
215
Mason v. Regional Medical Center, 121 F.R.D. 300, 301 (W.D. Ky. 1988); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1987).
216 Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 537.
See id at 534.
217
218 See Note, Anonymity in Donation Situations, supra note 3, at 201.
219 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
226 Id at 537.
221 Id
Id (quoting Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist.
222
Ct. App. 1985)).
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is not at issue because the blood bank has acknowledged that a donor provided HIV-infected blood. The plaintiff wants to identify
and depose the donor to learn more about what occurred during
that donor's screening. As the court stated in Boutte v. Blood Sys-

tems, 223 the plaintiffs wanted to know "whether, from the donor's

perspective, the screening procedures were followed." 224 An inquiry focusing on what procedures the blood bank followed during
the screening process involves far less intrusion into the privacy of
the donor than an inquiry aimed at determining a donor's HIV status. In Boutte, the plaintiffs' questions regarding the screening process included: (1) whether the donor received the information
sheets describing persons at risk for AIDS; (2) whether the blood
bank interviewer asked the questions on the questionnaire; and (3)
whether the donor understood those questions. 2 25 Whether, for example, the donor lied about his behavior during the screening process is irrelevant, because the veracity of his responses does not
address the issue of the blood bank's adherence to the screening
procedures. Thus, the single donor inquiry is rather benign and
certainly represents less of an intrusion than that which would likely
occur in the multiple donor case. 2 26 Accordingly, in single donor

cases, the donor has less of an interest in keeping his identity confidential than he does in multiple donor cases.
In single donor cases, courts have permitted discovery while
limiting it with confidentiality safeguards. These safeguards should
minimize the inconvenience or harm a donor may suffer. They seek
to prevent public disclosure of the donor's HIV status-the donor's
greatest concern. These safeguards have included a Rule 31 deposition upon written questions routed through the clerk of the
court;2 2 7 a Rule 31 deposition upon written questions at which the

donor could conceal his identity from the court reporter and the
127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989).
Id. at 126; see Mason v. Regional Medical Center, 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky.
1988); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1013
(Colo. 1988); Doe v. University of Cincinnati, 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 232, 538 N.E.2d
419, 424 (1988). In single donor cases, the court can prevent the plaintiffs from questioning the donor on personal matters by permitting discovery but limiting the scope of
the questioning to whether, from the donor's perspective, the blood bank adhered to its
screening procedures. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4). Under Rule 26(c)(4) the court may
make a protective order stating "that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters." Id.
225
Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 125.
226 But see Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360, 362 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
(in single donor case where court denied discovery, plaintiff sought to question donor as
to membership in groups at high risk for AIDS); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood
Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 651 (D.S.C. 1989) (plaintiffs sought discovery of "intimate details of [the donor's] health history"); see also supra note 123.
227
Bele Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1013-14.
223

224
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blood bank's counsel; 2 28 and a court limitation on the persons who
learn the donor's identity during discovery, coupled with a court or229
der prohibiting them from disclosing their knowledge.
A risk does exist, despite these safeguards, that public disclosure could occur. As the court stated in Doe v. American Red Cross
Blood Services, the courts that sought to both permit discovery and
maintain a measure of donor confidentiality "could offer the donors
no guarantees." 23 0 A Rule 31 deposition upon written questions,
routed through the clerk of the court, can minimize the risk of public disclosure because nobody on the plaintiff's side of the litigation
ever learns the identity, address, or telephone number of the donor.
Beyond the safeguards that should satisfy the donor's interest
in confidentiality, these single donor cases contain an element of
donor responsibility that should affect the court's willingness to protect the donor's confidentiality. This notion of blood donor responsibility, or at least donor participation, enters the calculus when the
blood bank has identified the repeat donor from whom the plaintiff
received HIV. The donor, perhaps unwittingly, played an important
causal role in the plaintiff's acquisition of the disease. One study,
though, indicates that sixty-nine percent of donors who tested
positive were aware of their own risk of HIV infection prior to
23
donating. '
This notion of donor responsibility or participation suggests
that the court view the donor as a party to the litigation in determining whether to permit discovery. One commentator, however, who
does not distinguish between multiple and single donor cases, argues that blood donors' status as "merely third parties" provides
2 32
"[a]n additional reason to protect blood donors from discovery."
This argument stems from case law stating that where the subject of
233
discovery is a nonparty, that status weighs towards nondisclosure
Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 126.
Mason, 121 F.R.D. at 303-04.
Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 652 (D.S.C. 1989).
L. Doll, HIV-Seropositive Persons-Why They Donate Blood, abstractedin 29 TRANsFuSION 80S (Supp. 1989). Some blood donors may have known of the risks they posed to
transfusion recipients. Id. A recent study by researchers at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta revealed that 69% of blood donors who later tested HIV-positive were
aware of their own risk of HIV infection prior to donation. Id Reasons for donation
included pressure to donate at the workplace (29%), desire to undergo testing (12%),
and failure to thoroughly read educational materials encouraging self-deferral (44%).
Id The study concluded: "Educational programs should help donors counter pressure
to donate, not rely solely on printed materials, and provide stronger, clearer messages
to enhance risk perception." Id.
232 Note, Anonymity in Donation Situations, supra note 3, at 194.
233 Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-Air Eng'g, 813 F.2d 1207, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 101 F.R.D. 355, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 758
228
229
230
231
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or more limited discovery. 23 4 In Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co. ,235 for example, the court permitted the defendant's discovery of aspects of
the plaintiffs' sexual histories, yet denied the same inquiry into the
lives of the plaintiffs' sexual partners. 23 6 The court stated that it was
"concerned about the potential for intrusion on the privacy rights of
23 7
third parties who are strangers to these lawsuits."
In multiple donor cases, where no donor necessarily carries
HIV nor suffers from AIDS, the donors may well be third parties,
strangers to the lawsuits. By contrast, in single donor cases, the donor is no stranger. Indeed, but for the donor's action, the plaintiff
would have suffered no injury nor would any lawsuit have arisen.
The court need not view the donor's role in terms of creating donor
liability. Rather, the court should take into account the donor's role
in the lawsuit and view him as a party, thereby creating another factor weighing in favor of permitting limited discovery under Rule
26(c).

Pursuant to the doctrine of "imperfect rescue," the altruistic
motivation of the donor should in no way influence a court's decision on whether to infringe on the donor's privacy. In Krygier v.
Airweld, Inc.,238 the court cited the donor's altruism as relevant to the
applicability of the physician-patient privilege. 23 9 Similarly, in balancing the interests under the Ohio equivalent of Rule 26(c), the
court in Doe v. University of Cincinnati240 stated that "the charitable

act that is involved when a person donates his or her blood must be
recognized." 241
Under the common-law principle of "imperfect rescue," voluntary assistance by an altruistic actor can render him liable to the
individual he assists if, by his efforts, he either leaves the individual
in worse condition or forecloses potential assistance by others. 242
F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 71 F.R.D.
388, 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
234
Collins & Aikman Corp. v.J.P. Stevens & Co., 51 F.R.D. 219, 221 (D.S.C. 1971);
see Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1277 (7th Cir. 1982).
255
122 F.R.D. 580 (D. Or. 1988).
236
Id at 582.
237
Id.; see Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(status as a nonparty is significant in determining whether discovery would represent an
undue burden), aft'd, 870 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
238
137 Misc. 2d 306, 520 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
239
Id at 308-09, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
240
42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (1988).
241
Id. at 233, 538 N.E.2d at 425.
242
See United States v. Devane, 306 F.2d 182, 186 (5th Cir. 1962) (where Coast
Guard in its discretion undertook rescue efforts for lost ship, it acquired a duty to use
reasonable care in the rescue operation); Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 559,
362 N.E.2d 960, 964, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161, 165 (1977) (The plaintiff alleged that the police
acted negligently in transporting him, while he was intoxicated, to an area adjacent to a
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As Judge Richard Posner explained in Jackson v. City of Joliet:243
"[T]here is of course no general common law duty to rescue a stranger in distress ....But if you do begin to rescue somebne you must
complete the rescue in a nonnegligent fashion .... "244 The actor's
altruistic action gives rise to a duty of care and potential tort liability
for a breach of that duty. Consequently, the actor's altruistic motivation in no way immunizes him from liability.
Applying this notion to the blood donor who provided the distressed plaintiff with infected blood, the donor has effectively prevented the plaintiff from receiving healthy blood. Of course, the
donor may have acted non-negligently in donating blood. The
point, however, is that good intentions can give rise to a duty of
care, the breach of which can create liability. Just as altruism will
not shield an actor from tort liability, neither should it immunize
him from submission to a deposition--especially when that questioning could enable an injured plaintiff to receive compensation
from another.
Finally, in single donor cases, the court should evaluate the
donor's interest in confidentiality in light of his current health. The
discovery request may come before the court several years after the
donor has suffered exposure to the virus that causes AIDS, particularly because the bulk of the cases will arise from pre-1985 transfusions.2 45 By this time, the donor may suffer AIDS-related complex24 6 or full-blown AIDS, rendering his ailment obvious to those
around him. Under these circumstances, the donor has a reduced
need to maintain the confidentiality of his identity.2 4 7 If the donor's
superhighway where he was struck and injured by an automobile. The court stated:
"[t]he case law is dear that even when no original duty is owed to the plaintiff to undertake affirmative action, once it is voluntarily undertaken, it must be performed with due
care."); 3

S. GRAY,THE LAW OF TORTS
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1966);

FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMINGJAMES,JR. & OSCAR

§ 18.6, at 722 (2d ed. 1986); see also

§ 56, at 378 (W. Page
Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
243 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (state officers
allegedly acted negligently by stopping at the scene of an auto accident but failing to
render needed assistance).
244 Id. at 1202.
245
For data on projections, see infra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
246 AIDS-related complex (ARC) is a condition caused by HIV whose symptoms indude "intermittent or persistent fever, fatigue, weakness, diarrhea, malaise, weight loss,
...and generalized swelling of the lymph nodes.., in the neck, armpits, or groin." 1
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, LAWYER'S EDITION

THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRrrANNIcA

67 (1987). ARC may develop into AIDS, which

involves a fatal deterioration of the body's immune system. Id For general information
on AIDS, see supra notes 1-2.
247
Bruce A. McDonald, EthicalProblemsfor PhysiciansRaised by AIDS and HIVInfectiom
Conflicting Legal Obligationsof Confidentiality and Disclosure, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 557, 577
(1989).
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disease is obvious to those around him, the court should permit limited discovery.
In sum, factors including the narrow scope of the inquiry, the
privacy safeguards and the notion of donor responsibility indicate
that limited discovery will not unduly or unjustifiably infringe upon
the donor's interest in confidentiality in single donor cases.
4.

Society's Interest in a Safe and Adequate Blood Supply

In both single and multiple donor cases, blood banks have asserted society's interest in a safe and adequate volunteer blood system. Blood banking experts and legal commentators agree that a
volunteer blood system is far superior to a paid blood collection system because donors motivated by money are often indigent and
therefore more likely to carry infectious diseases than the public at
large. 248 In deciding whether to permit discovery in other contexts,
courts consider societal interests (as opposed to the litigant's interests). Examples include society's interest in the integrity of the peer
review process, 24 9 the maintenance of a unique data bank of medical
2 51
records, 2 50 the promotion of academic public policy research,
248 For views of several experts, see National Blood Policy, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,702
(1974) (supporting the development of an all-volunteer blood system); Protectionof Confidentiality of Records of Research Subjects and Blood Donors: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
184 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Robert W. Reilly, President, American
Blood Resources Association) (volunteer blood system enables selection of safest donors); id at 177 (testimony of Dr. Joseph R. Bove, M.D., Professor of Laboratory
Medicine at Yale University School of Medicine and Director of Blood Banking at YaleNew Haven Hospital) (volunteer blood ensures the adequacy of the blood system); see
also Charles Marwick, Six-Year Slowing Noted in Previously Growing Rate of U.S. Blood Collections, Transfusions, 261J. A.M.A. 968, 969 (1989) (current system is highly effective). For
the views of several legal commentators, see Bollow & Lapp, supra note 3, at 371; Lipton,
supra note 3, at 160-61; Note, Anonymity in Donation Situations, supra note 3, at 206-07.
249 See University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (finding tenure
decisions not subject to common-law privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501);
Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982) (Where college instructor,
denied tenure but not provided with reasons, sought discovery of tenure committee
votes in order to prove intentional discrimination, district court improperly denied discovery despite legitimate concerns that such discovery would chill candid peer evaluations and could potentially disrupt both faculty harmony and academic freedom.).
250 Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1983). In Andrews, the court
denied defendant discovery of "the Registry," a continually updated repository of data
concerning the conditions of 500 patients suffering from dear cell adenocarcinoma of
the genital tract. Id at 499-502. The court reasoned that not only did the defendant
have merely a speculative interest in obtaining the data, but disclosure would cause both
doctors and their patients to withhold their records from the Registry, thus destroying it
and depriving society of a unique and vital resource. Id
251 Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 71 F.R.D. 388, 390 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (court denied discovery of documents concerning confidential research interviews
because of the supplementary nature of the information sought and the public interest

1991]

NOTE-AIDS LITIGATION

957

and the confidentiality of government informants. 252 None of these
societal interests, however, seems to provoke as much disagreement
as exists in the blood donation context.
Courts disagree on whether disclosure of blood donor identities will affect the volunteer blood system. Numerous courts have
argued that disclosure will negatively affect the system. 253 In Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Services, 25 the court stated that disclosure of

donor identities could seriously hurt the volunteer blood system because the prospect of donor questioning and disclosure creates the
type of disincentive that could discourage donations 255 and would
render some donors reluctant to answer truthfully to questions
posed in the screening process. 256 By contrast, other courts have
argued that disclosure will either not hurt the volunteer system, or
will improve the safety of the blood system; others have asserted
that such concerns about the system lie outside of the province of
257
the judiciary.
Like the courts, commentators disagree on the effect donor disclosure will have on the volunteer blood supply. Lipton and a student commentator, echoing the concerns voiced in Doe v. American
in maintaining open channels of communication between academic researchers and
their sources).
252
See Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303 (5th
Cir. 1972) (Secretary of Labor may withhold discovery of informant's identity to further
society's interest in effective enforcement of a statute).
253
See Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. 646, 652-53 (D.S.C.
1989); Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d 533, 537-38 (Fla. 1987); Krygier
v. Airweld, Inc., 137 Misc. 2d 306, 309, 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (Sup. Ct. 1987); Taylor v.
West Penn Hosp., 48 Pa. D. & C.3d 178, 186-90 (1987). Several courts, including Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Servs., cite testimony before a House subcommittee, Hearings,
supra note 248, at 111-202, in which blood banking experts testified that maintaining the
confidentiality of AIDS-exposed blood donors was essential to the system. Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs., 125 F.R.D. at 652 n.8.
254
125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989).
255
Id. at 653.
256
257

Id

Boutte v. Blood Sys., 127 F.R.D. 122, 126 (W.D. La. 1989); Mason v. Regional
Medical Center, 121 F.R.D. 300, 303 (W.D. Ky. 1988); Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood
Center v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003, 1012-13 (Colo. 1988); Tarrant County Hosp.
Dist. v. Hughes, 734 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). Both Boutte and Bele Bonfils
argue that disclosure will have an effect consistent with society's interest in a safe blood
supply. Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 126; Belle Bonfils, 763 P.2d at 1012-13. As the court stated
in Boutte, permitting limited discovery from the donor "will ensure that blood suppliers
establish and implement only the highest standards in collecting and selling blood."
Boutte, 127 F.R.D. at 126. Tarrantargues that ajudicial determination that disclosure will
hurt the blood supply remains just as speculative as the assertions that discovery would
benefit society by discouraging undesirable donors from donating. Tarrant,734 S.W.2d
at 680. Finally, the court in Mason found little in the record to justify any position on
how disclosure would impact the blood supply. Mason, 121 F.R.D. at 303. The court
stated its reluctance "to venture into the realm of public policy" because that is the
"province of other branches of government." Id
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Red Cross Blood Services, argue that disclosure will harm the blood
supply. 25 8 In opposition, Jenner argues that disclosure will not have
this adverse effect. 259 He points out that the blood banking industry
has proffered no studies, reports, or surveys to ground its argument
260
that the possibility of disclosure would deter blood donations.
He adds that given possible disclosure, donors not at risk for HIV
infection would continue to donate while those at risk would properly refrain. 2 6 1 Jenner states that blood banks, by refusing disclosure, seek to immunize themselves from liability, thus escaping
26 2
judicial scrutiny of their operations.
Another student commentator 265 uses a more subtle approach,
arguing that the existence, since 1985, of a highly accurate test for
the presence of HIV has rendered the blood bank's argument "virtually insignificant. ' 2 64 She explains that because testing will screen
out 99.8% of the HIV-infected blood, prospective donors will face
virtually no threat of questioning by a transfusion recipient-hence,
no deterrence. 2 65 Medical research data lend support to this commentator's thesis that a prospective blood donor would now face
little threat of disclosure if courts permitted discovery. Blood banks
implemented a highly effective blood test, known as the ELISA procedure, in 1985.266 This improvement has dramatically decreased
the incidence of transfusion-related HIV infection, 26 7 but will not
eliminate it because of the occurrence of false negatives and the latency period between infection and the appearance of the an258
ipton, supra note 3, at 160-61; Note, Anonymity in Donation Situations, supra note 3,
at 206-09.
259 Jenner, supra note 3, at 50.
260

Id.

261 Id
262 id Jenner also states that "[tihe depleted-blood-supply argument may simply be
a theoretical one advanced in order to prevent disclosure." L at 51.
263 Note, Competing Interests, supra note 3.
264 Idoat 573.

265 Id Kirsh responds by stating that because so few of these donor cases will arise,
denial of disclosure can maintain a safe and adequate blood supply without foreclosing
recovery to a large group of plaintiffs. Note, Anonymity in Donation Situations,supra note 3,
at 209. Kirsh describes the alternative, permitting discovery for a small number of plaintiffs, as "potentially devastating the quality and quantity of the nation's blood supply."
Id
266 John C. Petricciani &Jay S. Epstein, The Effects of the AIDS Epidemic on the Safety of
the Nation's Blood Supply, 103 PuB. HEALTH REP. 236, 237 (1988); see also Is the Blood Supply
Safe?, 1987 CONSUMER REP. 596, 596 ("The ELISA test, or 'enzyme-linked immu-

nosorbent assay,' detects an antibody to the AIDS virus, indicating that the prospective
donor has been exposed to infection. The test, which is now performed on all donated

blood, is designed for maximum sensitivity .... ).
267 John W. Ward, et al., Transmission of Human Immunodefxiency Virus (HIV) by Blood
Transfusions Screened as Negativefor HIV Antibody, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 473, 476 (1988)

[hereinafter Ward].
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tibody. 26 8 Estimates of the current annual rate of HIV infection via
transfusions of tested blood range from approximately 100 to 460
recipients per year, of which only 40% will survive the condition for
which they received blood. 2 69 By contrast, predictions of the ultimate number of AIDS cases attributable to blood transfusions prior
to July 1985 range much higher. One study estimates that eventually between 14,300 and 15,000 cases of AIDS will result from these
transfusions. 2 70 The Centers for Disease Control estimate that in
1984 alone transfusions infected 7200 persons with HIV. 27 1 These
data indicate that very few plaintiffs will seek discovery from current
or future donors (hence no deterrent effect going forward), but the
potential exists for a significant number of discovery requests related to lawsuits arising from pre-1985 donations.
The conflicting arguments and absence of studies indicate that
it remains unclear, if not speculative, whether disclosure of donor
identities has the potential to devastate or even impact the nation's
blood supply. If disclosure of donor identities does have any effect
on the blood supply, it would likely occur only in the multiple and
not in the single donor case.
First, in the multiple donor case, the plaintiff seeks discovery
from the donor of each unit of blood he received. In Rasmussen v.
South FloridaBlood Service, for example, the plaintiff sought discovery
from all fifty-one donors. 2 72 In the single donor case, the plaintiff
seeks discovery from only the one donor identified as HIV-positive.
The fewer number of donors affected should minimize whatever total deterrent effect might result.
Second, if courts permit disclosure in multiple donor cases, a
donor who had no reason to perceive himself at risk and who is not
HIV-positive could undergo discovery; this judicial policy could
possibly deter healthy donors. By contrast, in the single donor case,
only the HIV-positive donor must submit to discovery, precisely the
type of donor that blood banks would like to deter from donating.
The truly healthy donor, not at risk, could rest assured that no recipient will question him, and thus he would not be deterred.
Third, in the multiple donor cases, because the inquiry focuses
on whether the donor is HIV-positive, the probing nature of the inquiry could have more of a deterrent effect. In the single donor case
in which the court limits the inquiry to the screening process, this
Id; Legal and Ethical Concerns, supra note 3, at 110.
Ward, supra note 267, at 476.
J.D. Kalbfleisch & J.F. Lawless, Estimating the Incubation Time Distribution and Expected Number of Cases of Transfusion-AssociatedAcquiredImmune Deficienc Syndrome, 29 TRANsFUSION 672, 672 (1989).
271
1988 Update, supra note 1, at 3.
272
500 So. 2d 533, 534 (Fla. 1987).
268
269
270
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less intrusive discovery should have less, if any, deterrent effect. 2 73

In sum, limited discovery with adequate safeguards, in single
donor cases, should have no effect on the quality and quantity of the
nation's volunteer blood supply.
IV
PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION

The differences between single donor cases, in which the blood
bank has identified a donor as HIV-positive and has traced the donation to the plaintiff, and multiple donor cases, in which only one
(or even none) of the donors may carry HIV, require different judicial responses. In the single donor case, because the information
sought focuses on the screening process, discovery intrudes less on
the donor's privacy than in the multiple donor case, in which each
donor's HIV status is at issue. In the single donor case, the court
should not view the donor as a stranger to the litigation, but in the
multiple donor case most donors will be HIV-negative and therefore have no relationship to the litigation.
These differences, in conjunction with safeguards that create
only a minimal risk that discovery will lead to public disclosure of
the donor's identity, demonstrate that in single donor cases the
plaintiff's interest in discovering information necessary to prove his
claim outweigh the donor's interest in remaining free from discovery. Additionally, the potential impact on the blood supply remains
speculative. Any minimal impact on the blood supply that may result from limited disclosure of donor identities in single donor cases
in no way tips the balance in favor of complete denial of discovery.
Accordingly, in single donor cases, courts should permit limited discovery when the plaintiff shows a need for it.
By contrast, discovery in multiple donor cases could significantly infringe upon the donors' privacy, highlighted by the
probability that the plaintiff will seek personal information from
both donors and third parties and that public disclosure will result.
Further, the scope of discovery in this context increases the poten273

Even if one accepts the testimony of blood banking experts before a congres-

sional committee as the best evidence, those experts directed their concern to the effects
of discovery in multiple donor cases. Hearings,supra note 248, at 111-201. The focus of
the hearing was on the need for protective legislation. Id Virtually all of the testimony
concerning the confidentiality of blood donors referred to the dangers of the type of
discovery that subjected the donor to public disclosure and delved deeply into his personal life, as would result in a multiple donor case. Id None of the experts addressed
the type of limited discovery, strictly confined to the screening process and shielded
from public disclosure, sought in the typical single donor case.
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tial for harm to the volunteer blood supply. Accordingly, in multiple donor cases, courts should deny discovery.
Peter B. Kunin

